Protecting data and systems from intruders and cyber attacks

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ecording data in the blockchain. The anonymizer is turned on when the user receives an electronic ballot, and depersonalizes all subsequent actions of the person and the vote itself. Additionally, the voice is encoded using several encryption keys, and enters the information block with a random time delay. This entire set of tools and measures guarantees that no one, not even the system administrators, will be able to determine who owns a particular vote, where it came from and at what time it was cast.

It is possible to sum up the election georgia whatsapp resourceresults and calculate who voters voted for only after assembling a special decryption key. The decryption code is created before the voting begins and is immediately divided into seven parts. All of them are stored by different people who guarantee protection from access to their part of the code. Assembling the parts of the key together is a public procedure, and it begins only after the voting is over. After its completion, the counting of votes cast using electronic ballots begins. In addition, the key is placed in the public domain so that any independent observer can verify the correctness of the decryption of transactions and the accounting of votes.


All components of the Moscow electronic voting system are located in the city data processing center (DPC), which is reliably protected in accordance with regulatory requirements. The DPC uses a layered, i.e. multi-level, information security system. It is built entirely from domestic solutions and has been providing protection and round-the-clock monitoring of all Moscow information systems and data for many years. For greater reliability, the city uses several distributed DPCs that duplicate each other, and communication channels of different operators.

During the actual electronic voting at the elections, the capital's IT specialists have worked out scenarios to counteract cyberattacks, and a set of measures to ensure information security is provided. In particular, in the event of massive attacks with hacking attempts, the city can suspend the operation of some systems, components and online services.

The Moscow electronic voting system and the infrastructure of the Public Headquarters for Election Observation faced multiple cyber attacks during the Russian presidential elections in March 2024. Some of the attacks were carried out from botnet networks, and there were also a large number of direct attacks from foreign servers. The most massive attempts to disrupt the voting process and prevent Muscovites from making a choice were recorded during the daytime, when voters were highly active. Cybersecurity tools repelled all attacks: none of them achieved their goal, and the voting system was available 100% of the time.

Despite the lack of precedents, developers systematically continue to strengthen protection against external interference and take care of the further development of information security of the electronic voting system.