Were there any consequences for users?

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tanjimajuha20
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Were there any consequences for users?

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At the time of the failure, several RBC sources said that some operators simply disabled DNSSEC to restore connections for their subscribers. As reported by Konstantin Anisimov, CEO of the Russian hosting provider Rusonyx, disabling DNSSEC was an order from the Central Monitoring Center of the Security Service of the Russian Federation for the duration of the problem. After the failure was fixed, they were sent an order to enable the protocol, he noted.

A Roskomnadzor representative croatia whatsapp number database confirmed that after the incident was resolved, those operators who had disabled DNSSEC were instructed to restore it. He did not specify what proportion of operators in Russia used this protocol and how many of them had already restored it.

Nikita Tsaplin points out that disconnecting some operators from DNSSEC would be undesirable - without it, using resources is simply dangerous: for example, fraudsters can redirect a user's request to a "fake" page and steal their data. "The risks of working without DNSSEC are very high - no one will expose millions of people to them, these are costs, including reputational ones, which can be much more expensive than the downtime of a particular platform," he reasons.

According to Alexey Uchakin, when faced with the choice of "working, but with security risks" or "not working at all," operators will prefer the first option. "But if an operator turned off DNSSEC for a few hours during an emergency and then turned it back on, it did not create any additional threats to its subscribers," Uchakin believes.

According to RU-CENTER IT Director Evgeny Martynov, only specific operators can know about enabling or disabling DNSSEC. In the case of a complete disabling of DNSSEC, there is a possibility of forging responses to user requests using various methods, Martynov noted. But, according to him, there are other technologies that allow you to check that the system sent the user to the desired site, such as an SSL certificate. "Disabling DNSSEC verification as such does not pose a security threat, but it makes life easier for intruders," Martynov concluded.

However, the companies involved in information security surveyed by RBC did not record any waves of attacks from intruders at the time and immediately after the failure. In particular, this was reported by the FAC.S.T. company. There is no data on any mass cases of fraud during the failure on January 30, either, according to Maxim Aleksandrov, an expert in software products at the company "Security Code". "Intruders could have used this situation to increase the trust in their legend on the part of potential victims. The unavailability of many banking and corporate services caused a slight panic among users, so if the fraudsters had time to get their bearings, they could have offered to fix the problem under the guise of the telecom operator's support service, for example, by installing some software that would actually be malicious," Aleksandrov said. At the same time, he stipulated that too little time had passed since the incident. If similar situations recur, he recommends being careful when accepting calls from unknown numbers, calling back telecom operators and other operators of critical services independently and only through their official websites, and not installing additional software, especially not from official stores or a corporate portal.
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